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1 Introduction
All cooperative games (transferable utility games) on a finite set of palyers form a finite
dimensional vector spaoe (linear space). The set of unanimity games is a basis in this
vector space and the Harsanyi dividends are coefficients in the representatin of a game
as linear comibination of the unanimity games. Thus they play a very important role
in cooperative game theory. In this paper we discuss two practical situations of games,
restrictions on coalitions and fuzzy extensions of games, and show some useful results
based on the dividends.
2 Dividends for cooperative games
Let $N$ be a finite set of $n$ elements, i.e., $N=\{1,2, \ldots,n\}$ . Elements of $N$ are called
players. Any subset of $N$ is called a coalition. A (transferable utility) game on $N$ is a
set funcion $v:2^{N}arrow \mathrm{R}$ with $v(\emptyset)=0$ . The function $v$ is usualy called a characteristic
function and each value $v(S)$ is called the worth of the coalition $S$ . The set of all games on
$N$ is denoted by $\Gamma^{N}$ . In the following, we use abbreviated notations such as $v(\{i\})=v(i)$ ,
$S\cup\{i\}=S\cup i,$ $S\backslash \{i\}=S\backslash i$ and so on. We also denote the set $2^{N}\backslash \emptyset$ as $\Omega$ .
Definition 1 A game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is said to be
1. monotonic if $v(S)\leq v(T)$ for all $S,T\subseteq N$ such that $S\subseteq T$,
2. superadditive if $v(S)+v(T)\leq v(S\cup T)$ for all $S,T\subseteq N$ , such that $S\cap T=\emptyset$ ,
S. convex if $v(S)+v(T)\leq v(S\cup T)+v(S\cap T)$ , for all $S,T\subseteq N$, or equivalently if
$v(S\cup i)-v(S)\leq v(T\cup i)-v(T)$ , for all $i\in N$ , and $S\subseteq T\subseteq N\backslash i$ .
Deflnition 2 A game $v\in\Gamma^{N}\dot{u}$ said to be symmetric if the condition $|S|=|T|$ for all
$S,$ $T\subseteq N$ implies that $v(S)=v(T)$ .
The sum of two games $v,$ $w\in\Gamma^{N}$ is defined by $(v+w)(S)=v(S)+w(S)$ for all $S\subseteq N$ ,
and the scalar multiplication of $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ by a scalar a $\in \mathrm{R}$ is defined by $(\alpha v)(S)=\alpha v(S)$
for all $S\subseteq N$ . Thus the spaoe $\Gamma^{N}$ of all games on $N$ is a vector space and its dimension is
clearly $2^{n}-1$ , since each game is specified by the worths $v(S)$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}S\subseteq N$ with $S\neq\emptyset$ .
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for any $T\in\Omega$ . Then each game $v\in\Gamma$ is a linear combination of unanimity games,
$v= \sum_{\tau\epsilon\Omega}d_{T}(v)u_{T}$
.
The coefficient $d_{T}(v)$ is given by
$d_{T}(v)= \sum_{s\subseteq T}(-1)^{|T|-|S|}v(S)$
and called the (Harsanyi) dividend of $T$ for the game $v$ . For convenience’ sake, we may
put $\phi(v)=0$. In combinatorics, $d.(v)$ viewed as a set function on $\Omega$ is called the $\mathrm{M}_{0}^{u}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}$
transform of $v$ . The dividends satisfy the following recursive formula:
$d_{T}(v)=$
This formula can be also written as
$d_{T}(v)=$
It is obvious that $d_{T}(v+w)=d_{T}(v)+d_{T}(w),$ $d_{T}(\alpha v)=\alpha d_{T}(v)$ . We should also note that
$v(S)= \sum_{T\in\Omega,T\subseteq s}d_{T}(v),$
$\forall S\in\Omega$ .
Deflnition 3 A game $v\in\Gamma^{N}\dot{u}$ said to be
1. positive if $d_{S}(v)\geq 0$ for all $S\in\Omega$ .
2. almost positive if $d_{S}(v)\geq 0$ for $dlS\in\Omega$ such $that|S|>1$ .
We may describe some properties of games in terms of the dividends.
Proposition 1 A game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is spnmetric if and only if the folloning holds:
$|S|=|T|forS,T\subseteq N\Rightarrow d_{S}(v)=d_{T}(v)$ .
Recalling that
$v(S)= \sum_{\mu\tau\subseteq S}d_{T}(v)$




$\sum_{s’\subseteq s}\sum_{f\neq R\subseteq\tau\backslash s}d_{S’\cup R}(v)\geq 0$
for any $S,T\subseteq N$ with $S\subseteq T$. Similarly, a
game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is superadditive if and only if
$\sum_{\mathrm{f}\neq s’\subseteq s}\sum_{\#\tau’\subseteq T}d_{S’\cup T’(v)}\geq 0$
. Moreover, for
$S\subseteq N$ and $i\not\in S,$ $v(S \mathrm{U}i)-v(S)=\sum_{R\epsilon\Omega,R\subseteq S\cup i}d_{R}(v)-\sum_{R\epsilon\Omega,R\underline{\mathrm{C}}S}d_{R}(v)=\sum_{s’\underline{\mathrm{c}}s}d_{S’\cup i}(v)$ .
Therefore, a game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is convex if and only if
$\sum_{s’\subseteq s}d_{S’\cup \mathrm{t}}(v)\leq,\sum_{T\underline{\mathrm{C}}T}d_{T’\cup i}(v)$
, i.e.,
$\sum_{s’\subseteq s}\sum_{\iota\neq R\subseteq\tau\backslash s}d_{S’\cup nx^{(v)\geq 0}}$
for any $i\in N$ and $S\subseteq T\subseteq N\backslash i$ . Thus any positive game is convex.
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3Solutions based on the dividends for cooperative
games
In a game $v\in\Gamma$ , the main issue is the distribution of the worth $v(N)$ among the
palyers. A one-point solution of a game is specified by a function $\phi$ : $\Gamma^{N}arrow \mathrm{R}^{n}$ , which
asscoaites a payoff vector $\phi(v)=(\phi_{i}(v))_{i\in N}$ called the value with each game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ .
Since this function $\phi$ is usually assumed to be linear (with respect to $v$), the value is a
linear combination of the values for unanimity games, i.e.,
$\phi(v)=\sum_{T\in\Omega}d_{T}(v)\phi(u_{T})$ .




$\frac{1}{2^{|T\backslash i|}’}$ if $i\in T$
$0$ , otherwise.
respectively. Thus
$\varphi_{i}(v)=\sum_{\tau\epsilon\Omega,T\ni i}\frac{d_{T}(v)}{|T|},$ $\beta_{i}(v)=\sum_{\tau\epsilon\Omega N,T\ni i}\frac{d_{T}(v)}{2^{|\mathrm{J}\backslash i|}}$.
respectively.
More general value is given by the sharing system $p=(p_{i}^{T})_{T\in\Omega,i\in T}$ satisfying $p\geq 0$ and
$\sum_{j\epsilon\tau}p_{j}^{T}=1$
for each $T\in\Omega$ . The set of all sharing systems is denoted by $P$ . The payoff
vector $\psi(v)\in \mathrm{R}^{n},$ $p\in P$ , given by
$\phi_{1}^{\mathrm{p}}.(v)=\sum_{T\in\Omega,T\ni i}p_{i}^{T}d_{T}(v),$
$i\in N$
is called a Harsanyi payoff vector [5] or M\"obius value (in a restricted case) [3]. It is obvious
that $\sum_{i\epsilon N}\phi_{1}^{\mathrm{p}}.(v)=v(N)$ , i.e., the Harsanyi payoff vector is efficient. Strictly speaking, the
Shapley value is a Harsanyi payoff vector, but the Banzhaf value is not.
Other solutions are given by set-valued solutions. The most fundamental set-valued
solution is the oore of $v$ , defined by
$C(v)=\{x\in \mathrm{R}^{n}|x(N)=v(N), x(S)\geq v(S), \forall S\in\Omega\}$,
where $x(S)= \sum_{t\epsilon s}x_{i}$ . Another set-valued solution is the Harsanyi set (Derks et al. [5])
or the selectope (Bilbao et al. [2], Derks et al. [4]).
Deflnition 4 The $Ha\mathrm{r}san_{\dot{\Psi}}$ set $H(v)$ of a game $v\in\Gamma^{N}\dot{u}$ defined as the set of all
Harsanyi payoff vectors, $i.e.$ ,
$H(v)=\{\psi(v)|p\in P\}$ .
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The Harsanyi set can be defined in another way as the selectope (see Derks et al. [4]),
which will be discussed later.
Proposition 2[$\mathit{5}J$ For each game $v\in\Gamma^{N},$ $C(v)\subseteq H(v)$ . Moreover $C(v)=H(v)$ if and
only if $v$ is almost positive.
4 Dividends for cooperative games under restrictions
on coalitions
In this section we deal with restrictions on coalitions.
Deflnition 5 A subset of $2^{N},$ $i.e.$ , a set of coalitions $F$ is said to be a feasible coalition
system ($FCS$ for short) on $N$ if it satisfies the follounng:
$\emptyset\in F,$ $\{i\}\in F\forall i\in N$.
A maximal coalition that belongs to $F$ and is contained in $S$ is called an S-component
of $S$. We denote by $C_{F}(S)$ the se$\mathrm{t}$ of the $F$-oomponents of $S$ .
Deflnition 6 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ be a game and $\mathcal{F}$ be an $FCS$ on N. The $F$-restricted game
$v^{\mathcal{F}}\in\Gamma^{N}$ of $v$ is defined by
$v^{F}(S)= \sum_{\tau\epsilon C_{F}(S)}.v(T)$
.
Deflnition 7 An $FCSF$ on $N$ is said to be a partition system (PS for short) on $N$
if, for all $S\subseteq N$ , the set $C_{\mathcal{F}}(S)$ of F-components of $S$ is a partition, $i.e.$ , if $C_{\mathcal{F}}(S)=$
$\{T_{1}, \ldots,T_{l}\}$ then $T_{i}\cap T_{j}=\emptyset(i\neq j)$ and $\bigcup_{j=1}^{l}T_{j}=S$ .
An FCS $F$ is aPS if $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{d}$ only if
$S,T\in F,$ $S\cap T\neq\emptyset\Rightarrow S\cup T\in F$ .
Now we let $F$ be an FCS and consider the dividends for the $F$-restricted game $v^{\mathcal{F}}$ of $v$ .





Theorem 1 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ be a game and $F$ be a PS on N. Then
$d_{T}(v^{\mathcal{F}})=\{$
$d_{T}^{\mathcal{F}}(v)$ , $ifT\in F$,
$0$ , $ifT\not\in F$.
(Proof) Note that $\phi(v^{\mathcal{F}})=d_{\mathrm{f}}^{\mathcal{F}}(v)=0$ . We prove the theorem by induction. First let
$T=\{i\}$ for $i\in N$ . Then $T\in F$ and
$d_{T}(v^{\mathcal{F}})=v^{\mathcal{F}}(T)=v(T)=d_{T}^{\mathcal{F}}(v)$ .
Next consider the case $|T|>1$ and $T\in F$. Then
$d_{T}(ff)=v^{F}(T)- \sum_{s\mathrm{c}\tau}d_{S}(v^{\mathcal{F}})=v(T)-\sum_{S\mathrm{C}\tau,s\epsilon \mathcal{F}}d_{S}^{\mathcal{F}}(v)=d_{T}^{\mathcal{F}}(v)$
.
Finaly, consider the case $|T|>1$ and $T\not\in F$ with $C_{\mathcal{F}}(S)=\{T_{1}, \ldots,T_{l}\}$ . Then
$d_{T}(v^{F})=v^{F}(T)- \sum_{S\subset T}d_{S}(v^{F})=\sum_{j=1}^{l}v(T_{j})-\sum_{S\subset T,S\in \mathcal{F}}d_{S}^{F}(v)$.
If $S\subset T$ and $S\in F$ , then there exists $k\in\{1, \ldots, l\}$ such that $S\cap T_{k}\neq\emptyset$ . Sinoe $F$ is a
PS, $S\cup T_{k}\in \mathcal{F}$ . In view of maximaility of $T_{k},$ $S\cup T_{k}=T_{k}$ , which implies that $S\subseteq T_{k}$ .
Hence
$d_{T}(v^{F})= \sum_{j=1}^{l}\{v(T_{j})-\sum_{S\subseteq\tau_{j},s\epsilon F}d_{S}^{F}(v)\}=0$.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Thus if .1 ‘ is a PS, we may consider a one-point solution of a game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ under the
PS $F$ by the Harsanyi payoff vector of the restricted game $v^{F}$ , i.e., for $p\in P$ ,
$\phi_{i}^{p}(v^{\mathcal{F}})=\sum_{\tau\epsilon\Omega,T*}p_{i}^{T}d_{T}(v^{\mathcal{F}})=\sum_{T\in F,T\ni i}p_{i}^{T}d_{T}^{\mathcal{F}}(v),$
$i\in N$.
Now we consider set-valued solutions of $v$ under $F$.
Deflnition 8 Let $F$ be an $FCS$ on $N$ such that $N\in$ S. Then the core of $v$ under $F\dot{u}$
defined as follows:
$C(F,v)=\{x\in \mathrm{R}^{n}|x(N)=v(N), x(S)\geq v(S)\forall S\in F\}$.
Proposition 3 ld Let $F$ be a PS on $N$ with $N\in F$ . $\mathbb{R}en$
$C(v^{F})=C(F,v)$ .
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Deflnition 9 Let $F$ be an $FCS$ on $N$ such that $N\in F.$ A selector on $F$ is a function
$\alpha:\mathcal{F}\backslash \{\emptyset\}arrow N$ with $\alpha(S)\in S$ for every nonempty coalition $S\in F‘$ .
We denote by $A(\mathcal{F})$ the set of $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ selectors on S.
Deflnition 10 Let $F$ be an $FCS$ on $N$ such that $N\in F$ and $a\in A(\mathcal{F})$ be a selctor. The
selection corresponding to $a$ is the vector $m^{\alpha}(\mathcal{F},v)$ defined by
$m_{i}^{\alpha}(F,v)= \sum_{s\in \mathcal{F},\alpha(\mathit{3})=i}d_{S}^{\mathcal{F}}(v)$
for every $i\in N$ and $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ .
Deflnition 11 Let $F$ be an $FCS$ on $N$ such that $N\in \mathcal{F}$ . The selectope for a game
$v\in\Gamma^{N}$ under $F\dot{u}$ given by
$S(F,v)=\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{v}\{m^{\alpha}(F,v)|\alpha\in A(F)\}$ .




Deflnition 12 Let $F$ be an $FCS$ on N. The $\mathcal{F}$-restricted Harsanyi set of $v\dot{u}$ defined by
$H(F,v)=\{\phi^{F,\mathrm{p}}(v)|p\in P\}$ .
Theorem 2 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ be an $FCS$ on $Ns\mathrm{u}ch$ that $N\in$ F. Then
$S(\mathcal{F},v)=H(\mathcal{F},v)$ .
(Proof) $(\subseteq)$ For $(q_{\alpha})_{\alpha\epsilon A(F)},$
$q_{\alpha} \geq 0,\sum_{\alpha\in A(\mathcal{F})}q_{\alpha}=1$
, let
$p_{i}^{T}= \sum_{\alpha\epsilon A(F),\alpha(T)=i}q_{\alpha}$
for $T\in F$ ,
$T\neq\emptyset$ . For $T\not\in F$ , let $f$ be an arbitrary probability distribution on $T$ (It does not
appear in the following discussion). Then $p\geq 0$ and for $T\in F$
$\sum_{i\epsilon\tau}p_{i}^{T}=\sum_{t\epsilon T\alpha\epsilon A(}\sum_{F),\alpha\langle T)=i}q_{\alpha}=\sum_{\alpha\epsilon A\{\mathcal{F})}q_{\alpha}=1$
.
Hence $p\in P$ . Moreover,
$\phi_{i}^{\mathcal{F}_{1}p}(v)$
$= \sum_{\tau\epsilon F,T\ni i}F_{i}4^{F}(v)=\sum_{\tau\epsilon \mathcal{F},T\ni 1\alpha\epsilon A(}\sum_{\mathcal{F}),\alpha(T)=i}q_{\alpha}d_{T}^{F}(v)$
$= \sum_{\alpha\epsilon A\langle \mathcal{F})}q_{\alpha}\sum_{\tau\epsilon F,\alpha(T)=i}d_{T}^{F}(v)=\sum_{\alpha\epsilon A\langle \mathcal{F})}q_{\alpha}m_{i}^{\alpha}(\mathcal{F},v)$
.
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$(\supseteq)$ For $p\in P$ , let $q_{\alpha}=$ $\prod$ $p_{\alpha(S)}^{S}$ . Then $q_{\alpha}\geq 0$ and
$s\in \mathcal{F},S\neq 0$




$=$ $\sum q_{\alpha}$ $\sum$
$d_{T}^{F}(v)= \sum_{T\epsilon F,T\ni i}\sum_{\alpha\in A(\mathcal{F}),\alpha(T)=:}(\prod_{s\epsilon F,S\#}p_{\alpha(S)}^{S})d_{T}^{F}(v)$
$= \sum_{\tau\epsilon F,T\ni i}^{\alpha\epsilon A(\mathcal{F})}p_{i}^{T}[\prod_{s\epsilon \mathcal{F},s\mu,\tau}^{\epsilon F,\alpha(T)=}. (\sum_{\mathrm{j}\in S}p_{j}^{S})]d_{T}^{F}(v)=\sum_{\tau\epsilon r,\tau\ni i}p^{T}.d_{T}^{F}(v)=\phi_{i}^{\mathcal{F},\mathrm{p}}(v)\tau\cdot.$ .
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Corollary 1 If $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $F$ is a PS on $N$ such that $N\in F$, then $S(F,v)=H(v^{F})$ .
Definition 13 A game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is said to be almost $\mathcal{F}$-positive if $d_{S}^{F}(v)\geq 0$ for all $S\in F$
utth $|S|>1$ .
Proposition 4 [$\mathrm{J}J$ Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $F$ be an $FCS$ on $N$ such that $N\in \mathcal{F}$ . Then $S(\mathcal{F},v)\subseteq$
$C(F,v)$ if and only if $v$ is almost F-positive.
Deflnition 14 An $FCS\mathcal{F}$ on $N$ is said to be an intersecting system on $N$ if $S,T\in F$
with $S\cap T\neq\emptyset$ , then $S\cap T,S\cup T\in F$ .
Proposition 5 [1J Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $F$ be an intersecting system on N. Then $C(\mathcal{F},v)\subseteq$
$S(\mathcal{F},v)$ .
Corollary 2 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ be an almost $F$-positive game and $F$ be an intersecting system
on $N$ with $N\in \mathcal{F}$ . Then
$C(F,v)=C(v^{\mathcal{F}})=S(F,v)=S(v^{F})=H(F,v)=H(v^{F})$ .
5 Fuzzy extensions of cooperative games
In a cooperative game, each coalition $S\subseteq N$ can be identified with the vector $e^{S}$ defined
by $e_{i}^{S}=1$ if $i\in S$ and $e_{i}^{S}=0$ if $i\not\in S$ and the domain of the characteristic function $v$
is identified with $\{0,1\}$“. Hence extending $\{0,1\}^{n}$ to $[0,1]^{n}$ implies extending ordinary
(crisp) coalitions to fuzzy coalitions. Thus, given the player set $N$ , a cooperative fuzzy
game $\xi$ on $N$ is a function from $[0,1]^{n}$ to $\mathrm{R}$ with $\xi(0)=0$ . The set of all cooperative
fuzzy games on $N$ is denoted by $\Delta^{N}$ .
In this paper we use the following notations. First, the vector $e^{\langle i\}}$ is simply denoted by
$e^{i}$ . For $s,t\in[0,1]$“, vectors $s\vee t$ and $s$ A $t\in[0,1]^{n}$ are defined by
$(s \vee t):=\max\{s:,t_{i}\}$ , and ($s$ A $t$)$:= \min\{s:,t_{i}\},$ $i=1,2,$ $\ldots$ , $n$,
respectively. For $s\in[0,1]$“, let $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}s=\{i\in N|s_{1}>0\}$ .
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Definition 15 Cooperative fuzzy game $\xi\in\Delta^{N}\dot{u}$ said to be
1. monotonic if $\xi(s)\leq\xi(t)$ for all $s,t\in[0,1]^{n}$ such that $s\leq t$ .
2. weakly supemdditive if $\xi(s)+\xi(t)\leq\xi(s\vee t)$ for all $s,$ $t\in[0,1]^{n}$ such that $s\wedge t=0$ .
3. strongly superadditive if $\xi(s)+\xi(t)\leq\xi(s+t)$ for all $s,t\in[0,1]$“ such that $s+t\in$
$[0,1]$“.
4. convex if $\xi(s)+\xi(t)\leq\xi(s\vee t)+\xi$ ( $s$ A $t$) for all $s,t\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
The sum of two games 4, $\eta\in\Delta^{N}$ , and the scalar multiplication of 4 by $\alpha\in \mathrm{R}$ are
defined by
$(\xi+\eta)(s)=\xi(s)+\eta(s),$ $\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ ,
$(\alpha\xi)(s)=\alpha\xi(s)$ , $\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ ,
respectively. Thus, $\Delta^{N}$ is also a vector space.
A typical fuzzy game can be obtained from an ordinary cooperative game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ by
extending $v$ in an appropriate manner. This extension is denoted by $\xi_{v}$ hereafter.
Definition 16 The extension $\xi_{v}$ is said to be a $U$-extension if
$\xi_{v+w}=\xi_{v}+\xi_{w},$ for all $v,$ $w\in\Gamma^{N},$ $\xi_{\alpha v}=\alpha\xi_{v},$ for $allv\in\Gamma^{N},$ $\alpha\in$ R.
Moerover, a U-edension $\xi_{v}$ is called a $W- exten\epsilon ion$ if it additionally satisfies
$\xi_{\mathrm{u}_{T}}(s)=\xi_{\mathrm{u}_{T}}(s_{|T})$ , for all $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ ,
$\xi_{\mathrm{u}_{T}}(s)\leq\xi_{\mathrm{u}_{T}}(t)$ , for all $s,t\in[0,1]$“ such that $s\leq t$ .
Here $S_{|T}\in[0,1]$“ is defined by $(s_{|T}):=s_{i}$ if $i\in T$ and $(s_{|T})_{1}=0$ if $i\not\in T$ .
Sinoe the spaoe $\Gamma^{N}$ of all cooperativce games on $N$ is a linear space and the set of
unanimity games forms a basis, a $\mathrm{U}$-extension of any game $v$ is specified by those of
unanimity games. Namely, if 4 is a $\mathrm{U}$-extension, then
$\xi_{v}(s)=\sum_{\tau\subseteq N}d_{T}(v)\xi_{u_{T}}(s),$
$\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
We obtain a stronger result for a W-extension.
Proposition 6 If $\xi_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ is a $W$-extension $ofv\in\Gamma^{N}$ , then
$\xi_{v}(s)=\sum_{T\subseteq\iota \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}}$
‘
$d_{T}(v)\xi_{u_{T}}(s),$ $\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
Two well-known examples of $\mathrm{W}$-extensions are the multilinear extension and the Lov\’asz
extension. The multilinear extension $m_{v}$ of $v$ , introduced by Owen [8], is given by
$m_{\mathrm{u}_{T}}(s)= \prod_{:\epsilon T}s_{i}$. The explicit formula of the multilinear extension is given by
$m_{v}(s)= \sum_{s\subseteq N}(\prod_{i\in s}s_{1}\prod_{i\epsilon N\backslash s}(1-s_{1}))v(S),$
$\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
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On the other hand, the Lov\’asz extension [6] $l_{v}$ is given by $l_{u_{T}}(s)= \min_{*\epsilon T^{S}:}.$ . For
$s\in[0,1]^{n}$ and $h\in[0,1]$ , let $[s]_{h}=\{i\in N|s_{i}\geq h\}$ . Then the explicit formula for the
Lov\’asz extension can be written as
$l_{v}(s)= \int_{0}^{1}v([s]_{h})dh,$ $\forall s\in[0,1]"$ .
Some properties of these extensions are given in Tanino [9].
Proposition 7 If a cooperative game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is superadditive, then its Lov\’asz extension
$l_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ is weakly supemdditive.
Proposition 8 If a cooperative game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is convex, then its Lov\’u$z$ extension $l_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$
is a convex cooperative fuzzy game.
Proposition 9 A game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is convex if and only if its Lov\’asz $e$ vtension $l_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ is
a strongly superadditive coopemtive fuzzy game.
6 Fuzzy extensions with restrictions on coalitions
If we deal with fuzzy extensions and restrictions on coalitions together in cooperative
games, there may exist two approaches:
1. First obtain the restricted game of the original crisp game and extend it.
2. First extend the original crisp game and obtain its restricted game.
In the first approach, we obtain the game $\xi,$ . In order to discuss the second approach,
we introduce some concepts (see Moritani et al. [7]).
Deflnition 17 A set $F\subseteq[0,1]^{n}$ is called a feasible fuzzy coalition system (FFCS for
short) on $N$ if
1. $\alpha e^{1}’\in F$ for any $\alpha\in[0,1]$ .
2. For any $s\in[0,1]$“ and $t\in F$ satisfying $t\leq s$ , there eais$ts\overline{t}\in C^{F}(s)$ such that $t\leq\overline{t}$.
Here a vector $\mathrm{r}\in[0,1]^{n}$ is said to be an $F$ -vector of $s$ if
$r\leq s,$ $r\in F$, and $r\leq \mathrm{r}’\leq s$ with $r’\in F$ imply that $r’=r$,
and $C^{F}(s)$ is the set of all $F$-vectors of $s$ .
Deflnition 18 Given a cooperative fuzzy game $\xi\in\Delta^{N}$ and an FFCS $F$ on $N$ , the




Definition 19 FFCS $F$ on $N$ is said to be a partition fuzzy system ($PFS$ for short) if it
satisfies one of the follouring equivalent conditions:
1. $C^{F}(s)$ is a partition of $s$ for any $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
2. For each $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ , there esis$ts$ a partition $\{I_{1}, \ldots, I_{l}\}$ of $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}s$ such that $C^{F}(s)=$
{ $S_{|I_{1}},$ $\ldots,$ $S_{|I_{\iota\}}}$ , where the vector $s_{|I_{j}}$ is defined by $(s_{|I_{J}})_{k}=s_{k}$ if $k\in I_{j}$ and $(s_{|I_{j}})_{k}=0$
otherwise.
3. If $s,y\in F$ and $s\wedge y\neq 0$ , then $s\vee y\in F$ .
The FFCS $F(F)$ corresponding to an FCS $F$ is defined as follows:
$F(\mathcal{F})=\{s\in[0,1]"|\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}s\in F\}$ .
Proposition 10 If.$F$ is an $FCS$ on $N$, then the corresponding $F(F)$ is an FFCS on $N$ .
If $F$ is a PS, then $F(\mathcal{F})$ is a $PFS$.
In the second approach, we obtain the fuzzy game $(\xi_{v})^{F(F)}$ . Our interest lies in the
question whether $\xi_{v^{\mathcal{F}}}$ and $(\xi_{v})^{F(\mathcal{F})}$ coincide or not.
Lemma 1 Let $F(F)$ be the FFCS on $N$ corvesponding to an $FCSF$ on N. For an
arbitmry $s\in[0,1]$“, let $C_{F}(\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}s)=\{I_{1}, \ldots, I_{l}\}$. Then the set of all $F$ -vectors of $s$ is
given by $C^{F(\mathcal{F})}(s)=\{s_{|I_{1}},$ $\ldots,S_{|I_{\iota\}}}$ .
Lemma 2 Let .7‘ be a PS on $N$ and $C_{F}(\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}s)=\{I_{1}, \ldots, I_{l}\}$ $fors\in[0,1]$“. Then
$\{T\in F|\emptyset\neq T\subseteq \mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}s\}=\{T\in F|T\neq\emptyset, \exists_{1}k\in\{1, \ldots , l\} : T\subseteq I_{k}\}$ .
Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ be a game, $F$ be a PS on $N$ and $\xi$ be a $\mathrm{W}$-estension. For $s\in[0,1]$“, let
$C_{F}(\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}s)=\{I_{1}, \ldots, I_{l}\}$ . Then
$\xi_{v^{\mathcal{F}}}(s)=\sum_{j=1T\epsilon}^{l}\sum_{F,T\underline{\mathrm{C}}I_{j}}d_{T}(v^{F})\xi_{u_{T}}(s_{|I_{j}})$ .
On the other hand,
$( \xi_{v})^{F\langle F)}(s)=\sum_{j=1T}^{l}\sum_{\subseteq I_{f}}d_{T}(v)\xi_{u_{T}}(s_{|I_{\dot{f}}})$ .
Therefore, they are generaUy different.
Deflnition 20 $FCSF$ on $N\dot{u}$ said to be subcomplete if the condition $T\in F$ and $S\subseteq T$
implies that $S\in F.$ A subcomplete $FCS$ is simply wriuen as $SCS$.
Theorem 3 Let $\xi_{v}$ be a $W$-extension of a game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $F(\mathcal{F})$ be the FFCS corre-
sponding to an $FCSF$ on N. If $\mathcal{F}$ is an $SCS$ and PS, then $\xi_{v^{\mathcal{F}}}=(\xi_{v})^{F(\mathcal{F})}$ .
(Proof) If $F$ is an SCS, then $T\in F$ for all $T\subseteq I_{i}\in F$ and $d_{T}(v^{F})=d_{T}(v)$ for any
$T\in$ F. Therefore the theorem is immediate.
14
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have focused on the dividends for cooperative games and discussed some
solution concepts for cooperative games with restrictions on coalitions. Moreover we have
studied extensions of cooperative games to cooperative fuzzy games under restrictions on
coalitions. This research is supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
under the Grant-in-Aid for Scientic Research No. 16510114.
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